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COMMENTARY

Donald J. Rapson

I would like to address briefly some pragmatic and philosophical concerns that have been raised with respect to some of
the matters discussed at this symposium.
I. LETTERS OF CREDIT
First, concerning letter of credit law, I would like to draw
attention to some important provisions in revised article 5. In
particular, I would like to address a fundamental point in
revised Uniform Commercial Code section 5-116. UCC section
5-116(c) provides that:
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the liability
of an issuer, nominated person, or adviser is governed by any
rules of custom or practice, such as the Uniform Customs and
Practice for Documentary Credits, to which the letter of credit, confirmation, or other undertaking is expressly made subject. If (i) this Article would govern the liability of an issuer,
nominated person, or adviser under subsection (a) or (b), (ii)
the relevant undertaking incorporatesrules of custom or practice, and (iii) there is conflict between this article and those
rules applied to that undertaking, those rules govern except
to the extent of any conflict with the nonvariable provisions
specified in Section 5-103(c)(emphasis added).
The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) is a publication of the International Chamber of
Commerce, which is a private organization. Thus, if revised
article 5 is adopted by the states, a state statute will incorporate rules made by a private international body as to matters
of liability, so that the rules of that private body will preempt
many of the rules in the state statute. Moreover, the incorporation is so open-ended that it incorporates not only the UCP as
presently written but also the UCP as it may be amended or
revised in the future.
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This scenario raises an important issue concerning the
proper delegation of legislative authority. A proponent of section 5-116 may respond, perhaps, that the section does not
involve the delegation of legislative authority at all, but merely
authorizes parties to agree on alternate rules. In this sense,
the contention is that section 5-116 is merely a more particularized version of UCC section 1-102(3), which allows parties to
vary most UCC rules by agreement.
My pragmatic sensitivities, however, tell me that this
position is wrong. How, after all, does a beneficiary of a letter
of credit enter into such an "agreement" with the issuer and
when does that agreement occur? My experience has been that
the beneficiary gets the letter of credit at or shortly before the
closing or the funding of the transaction. Often, there is really
no opportunity to negotiate the terms of the letter of credit.
Accordingly, in terms of traditional contract law, I wonder how
one can say when and how an agreement has been made to
vary the rules provided for in the UCC. Under that reasoning,
the contract, such as it is, is formed simply when the beneficiary "accepts" a letter of credit issued by an issuer with which it
has no direct contact, by not objecting to the term incorporating the UCP. That is, silence results in a purported agreement
that the liability rules of the UCP preempt those of Article 5.
I have great difficulty in believing that this is an appropriate interpretation and application of section 1-102(3), notwithstanding a few recent decisions to that effect. I also find it
curious that the proponents of this attenuated use of contract
law are the same people who criticize others like myself for
applying contract principles to letters of credit. Moreover, it is
particularly troubling that the use of the magic words "subject
to the UCP" in the boilerplate of the letter of credit can preempt the UCC on important matters. For example, what would
happen if, at some future time, the UCP were amended to
provide for compulsory arbitration of all disputed issues?
Would the simple, boilerplate incantation of the phrase "subject to the UCP" then deprive a beneficiary of the ability to
seek judicial enforcement of the letter of credit? The drafters
have told me that the answer to this question is "yes." Similarly, what would happen if the UCP required mitigation of damages before a beneficiary could draw on a letter of credit?
Would a beneficiary then be prevented from drawing on a
letter of credit that incorporated the UCP without demonstrat-
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ing mitigation? I would hope not, but as revised article 5 is
written, I believe, unfortunately, that this would be the result,
so total is the delegation to the UCP.
II. SURETYSIP AND GUARANTY LAW
Second, I would like to address some important issues in
suretyship and guaranty law. Professor Cohen spoke about this
subject extensively, but declined to tell you that the new Restatement of Suretyship and Guaranty (for which he served as
Reporter) is a really wonderful document. Yet, wonderful as
that document is, one must wonder what its effect will be. In
describing an issue of suretyship and guaranty law, Professor
Cohen stated, perhaps inadvertently, that the Restatement
would govern the issue. I wish that were the case, but it is not
so simple. Restatements do not themselves govern anything.
They are merely the product of an esteemed, but private, organization-the American Law Institute. Restatements "govern"
only if the rules in them are adopted by courts.
I hope that the Restatement of Suretyship and Guaranty
will be widely accepted and applied by the courts, avoiding the
fate of its predecessor, the 1941 Restatement of Security (drafted by my mentor, Professor John Hanna). But acceptance will
not happen automatically. Rather, for the new Restatement to
be properly appreciated, a number of things will have to happen. First of all, American law schools will have to restructure
the way that they teach commercial law. In this country, there
are four decades of lawyers and judges who are unfamiliar
with suretyship and guaranty law because it has not been
taught in American law schools since the 1950s. When the
Uniform Commercial Code came upon us, law schools restructured their commercial law curricula to track the Code, which
deals in only a very sketchy fashion with the subject of suretyship and guaranty.
Equally important in determining whether the new Restatement will be widely accepted by the courts is the question
whether judges and lawyers will be willing to abandon hoary
precedents unthinkingly applied to case after case in favor of
the modern approach that the Restatement adopts. In this
regard, let us consider the relatively simple topic of extensions.
What happens if an obligee grants the principal obligor an
extension of the due date for fulfilling the underlying obliga-
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tion? The traditional common law rule, still dominant in most
jurisdictions, is that the mere granting of the extension automatically discharges the secondary obligor as a matter of strictissimi juris without the necessity of the secondary obligor
demonstrating any harm or prejudice that would result from
the extension. The Restatement, following the trail blazed by
revised article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, adopts a
very different rule. Under the Restatement rule, the secondary
obligor is discharged by an extension only to the extent that
the secondary obligor is harmed by it. While this is, I believe,
the better rule, it is not the traditional rule in most jurisdictions. What will motivate the courts to change the accepted
law in those jurisdictions?
The third thing that must happen for the new Restatement to achieve the influence it deserves is that lawyers who
structure and document commercial transactions must learn to
recognize suretyship and guaranty issues in the first place. At
present, that level of recognition, regrettably, does not exist. I
recently chaired a program at which we discussed a very simple hypothetical: A, the owner of a business has granted Bank
a security interest in all of A's assets; A then sells the assets to
B, who either assumes A's obligations to the Bank or takes the
assets subject to the Bank's security interest. Few people in
the audience knew that, as a matter of well-accepted law, B
becomes the principal obligor while A now assumes the role of
secondary obligor and, accordingly, gets the benefit of suretyship defenses. Indeed, in the course of my observations of both
lawyers who serve as in-house counsel to lenders and other
commercial lawyers, I have concluded that few are cognizant of
this basic rule of suretyship and guaranty law. It is to be
hoped that the Restatement will have an educative effect here,
but this remains to be seen.
The new Restatement recognizes a number of other changes from traditional suretyship rules. One change is the elimination of the ancient "reservation of rights" doctrine, which is
replaced with a new and more conceptually appropriate doctrine known as "preservation of recourse." This change is important in the area of workouts. Under the old reservation of
rights doctrine, an obligee who grants an extension to a principal obligor can avoid the automatic discharge of the secondary
obligor by saying to the principal obligor, "but I reserve my
rights against the secondary obligor." By so reserving rights
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against the secondary obligor, the obligee has brought about
two important legal results. First, the secondary obligor is not
discharged even if the reservation of rights has not been communicated to it. Second, the rights of the secondary obligor
(who then performs the obligation) as against the principal
obligor continue as though the extension had not been granted.
Thus, the obligee can enforce performance by the secondary
obligor and the secondary obligor may then seek performance
from the principal obligor without regard to the extension.
How many principal obligors realize that an extension granted
to them accompanied by the incantation of reservation of
rights language means that they may still be liable before the
extended due date? Under the new doctrine, there must be express language in the workout documents indicating that not
only is the obligee reserving its right to proceed against the
secondary obligor, but also that the principal obligor will remain liable to the secondary obligor. Will lawyers take cognizance of the Restatement and start to draft their documents in
accordance with the Restatement rules? Only time will tell.
The Restatement also clarifies the law governing waiver of
suretyship defenses. Most lawyers know that an obligee can
avoid suretyship defenses of secondary obligors by the simple
expedient of getting meaningful waivers of those defenses in
the documents establishing the secondary obligation. Indeed,
lawyers who are sensitive to suretyship issues are well versed
in drafting long, cumbersome documents with pages and pages
of waivers. Modern word processing enables ever-lengthier
documents with ever-lengthier waivers to be produced with
little additional effort. Are such lengthy waivers necessary?
Revised article 3 and, more importantly, the new Restatement
provide that a simple statement to the effect that "the secondary obligor waives all suretyship defenses" will suffice. Will
lawyers abandon their yards-long waivers for such a simple
sentence? I hope so, but what will motivate them to do so? Can
a Restatement which, of course, is not law until adopted by
courts, bring this about? Probably not.
This observation has led some to suggest that it would be
a good idea to codify the Restatement as a new article of the
Uniform Commercial Code and, in fact, many are suggesting
that such codification proceed immediately. While eventual
codification might well be appropriate, the problem is that the
Restatement is still new and many of its forward-looking provi-
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sions do not yet represent a consensus. There is a risk that the
beneficial effects of bringing these provisions into the Restatement, thus spurring the courts to adopt them, might be undone
if codification is undertaken too soon. The Restatement drafting process is, not surprisingly, significantly different from the
legislative drafting process. Most particularly, special interest
groups play a larger role in legislative drafting. Thus, Restatement rules that are less generous to those interest groups than
the older doctrines are likely to be at risk if the Restatement
rules are challenged before they have achieved a greater patina through adoption by the courts. While, of course, special
interests were present in the process of drafting the Restatement, there was a greater willingness to defer to the "better"
rule, as recommended and elucidated by the Reporter, because
the Restatement is not itself law. Such deference is unlikely to
be present in a legislative drafting effort.
While I once advocated that there be a UCC article devoted to suretyship, I now suggest greater caution. Let's wait five
or even ten years and see what happens to the rules set out in
the Restatement of Suretyship and Guaranty. If it has the
impact we all hope for, then we can proceed to codification. By
exercising this caution, we are likely to enact better rules.
There are numerous additional developments of significance in the new Restatement but, in the interest of brevity, I
will mention only one more. When those of us in the lending
business buy a portfolio of loans, we are quite concerned with
obtaining rights not only against the principal obligor on those
loans but also against any secondary obligors for them. Yet,
relatively few people know that in several jurisdictions a guaranty is not assignable as part of an assignment of the underlying loan if the guaranty, as it usually does in "plain vanilla"
guaranty forms, specifies only the name of the original creditor
as the beneficiary of the guaranty without expressly permitting
its assignment. This creates a serious problem in practice.
Those who are unaware of this doctrine can be the victims of
very unpleasant surprises, while those who are aware of the
doctrine have an important task to perform in advising their
clients as to the potential limits of the rights acquired. One of
the great benefits of the new Restatement is that it adopts the
better view that secondary obligations are generally assignable
and, indeed, are automatically assigned in conjunction with
assignment of the underlying obligation.
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III. CONCLUSION
This year has seen two major developments in the American law of credit enhancement-the promulgation of revised
article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and the approval of
the Restatement of Suretyship and Guaranty. Both of these
developments deserve careful study now and close attention
over the years.

